State v. the Riparian: A Problem of Water Use and Control by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1961 Issue 3 
January 1961 
State v. the Riparian: A Problem of Water Use and Control 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
State v. the Riparian: A Problem of Water Use and Control, 1961 WASH. U. L. Q. 257 (1961). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss3/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
NOTES
The State v. the Riparian:*
A Problem of Water Use and Control
It has always been recognized that our water resources serve to
fulfill a great variety of needs. However, it is becoming increasingly
apparent that in order to enable maximum utilization of these waters
with minimum waste, more efficient management is required. The
recreational aspects of water resources are important to the eco-
nomies of some states.' Thus, public access for fishing, hunting, swim-
ming and boating is important. Other states have problems dealing
with uses for industry,2 irrigation,3 water supply4 and navigation.5
Pollution of streams and lakes is a hazard that must be met.6 In an
effort to solve the water management problem while allowing greater
access to the public, state governments and their subdivisions are,
more and more, asserting control over the use of water.y One of the
most difficult problems that has arisen is the theory under which the
states have asserted control over waters which previously had been
privately administered. If the state claims ownership of the beds and
* The term "riparian" as used in this note refers to both the owner of land
bordering a stream and the owner bordering a lake (sometimes referred to
as a littoral owner).
1. See, e.g., Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791, 795 (Fla. 1959); State v. Adams,
89 N.W.2d 661, 687 (Minn. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 826 (1958).
2. State ex rel. Indiana Dept. of Conservation v. Kivett, 288 Ind. 623, 95 N.E.2d
145 (1950) ; Lake Land Co. v. State, 68 Ind. App. 439, 120 N.E. 714 (1918) ; Bis-
sell Chilled Plow Works v. South Bend Mfg. Co., 64 Ind. App. 1, 111 N.E. 932
(1916); Petraborg v. Zontelli, 217 Minn. 536, 15 N.W.2d 174 (1944); Culley v.
Pearl River Industrial Comm'n, 234 Miss. 788, 108 So. 2d 390 (1959).
3. Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Munninghoff v.
Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 255 Wis. 252, 259, 38 N.W.2d 712, 715 (1949)
(dictum).
4. Valparaiso City Water Co. v. Dickover, 17 Ind. App. 233, 46 N.E. 591
(1897); St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm'rs, 56 Minn.
485, 58 N.W. 33 (1894), aff'd, 168 U.S. 349 (1897); Bino v. City of Hurley, 273
Wis. 10, 76 N.W.2d 571 (1956).
5. Sherlock v. Bainbridge, 41 Ind. 35 (1872); Martin v. City of Evansville, 32
Ind. 85 (1869); Peoples' Ice Co. v. Steamer Excelsior, 44 Mich. 229, 6 N.W. 636
(1880).
6. West Muncie Strawboard Co. v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21, 72 N.E. 879 (1904);
City of Valparaiso v. Hagen, 153 Ind. 337, 54 N.E. 1062 (1899); State v. Wabash
Paper Co., 21 Ind. App. 167, 51 N.E. 949 (1898).
7. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 370.10(1) and §§ 373.071-373.251 (1960); Ind. Ann.
Stat. §§ 27-601-27-659 (Burns 1960); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 105.01-105.79 (West
Supp. 1960); S.D. Code §§ 61.0101-61.1054 (Supp. 1960).
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overlying waters of lakes and streams that have been considered
private, there may be a problem of the taking of property without
due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 8 If the
state claims such ownership under the federal doctrine of state
ownership of the beds of navigable waters, there is the problem of the
various tests of navigability, some of which seem to have outlived
their usefulness.9 If the state tries to claim an easement over the
waters, regardless of ownership of the beds, traditional views making
control of water dependent upon bed ownership must be changed.10
If the state claims a right to control waters by virtue of the police
power, issues of due process and reasonable use must be resolved."
If the state asserts a right to control the water by virtue of a right
to control navigation, the conflicting views of what constitute the
incidents of navigation must be determined.12 Then too, the commerce
clause of the federal constitution gives the federal government broad
powers in the area of controlling navigation;13 the states can only
act in the absence of conflicting federal legislation.' The theory
chosen by the state may depend upon the uses for which the waters
are desired. For swimming, boating and fishing, it would not be essen-
tial for the state to own the beds. However, for mining, drilling oil
wells or erecting docks and other structures, bed ownership is vital.
A look at the problems to be met by the assertion of control by the
states may aid in an evaluation of the various theories and their
utility in solving a wide variety of water use problems.
8. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. Tests of navigability such as the "saw-log" test, Whisler v. Wilkinson, 22
Wis. 572 (1868) have forced states into introducing into evidence such testimony
as that of an elderly man who remembered seeing logs being floated in the lakes
before the territory was a state. State v. Adams, 89 N.W.2d 661, 666, 251 Minn.
521, 526, (1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 826 (1958).
10. See, e.g., Sanders v. De Rose, 207 Ind. 90, 191 N.E. 331 (1934); State v.
Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 63 N.W.2d 278 (1954); State v. Taylor, 358 Mo. 279,
214 S.W.2d 34 (1948).
11. Appleby v. City of Buffalo, 221 U.S. 524 (1911); Pounds v. Darling, 75 Fla.
125, 77 So. 666 (1918).
12. Compare Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893) and
Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909), with Schulte v. Warren, 218
Ill. 108, 75 N.E. 783 (1905). In the Lamprey case the incidents of navigation were
interpreted liberally to include pleasure boating and all other public uses for
which the waters could be adapted. The common law incidents set forth in the
Broward case included fishing and bathing. The Schulte case, in contrast, held
that the rights of hunting and fishing are not incidents of navigation.
13. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. Although lands underlying navigable waters are
held by the states in trust for their citizens, the states' control is subject to the
paramount power of Congress to control such waters for he purposes of naviga-
tion in interstate and foreign commerce.




Navigability has long been associated with the right of both the
federal and state governments to control waters.15 By a rule well-
settled, the beds of all lakes and streams navigable at the time a state
entered the Union are held by the state in trust for the public.-6 The
federal test of navigability states that any lake or stream used or
susceptible of being used as a highway for commerce is in fact nav-
igable.17 Thus, in order for the federal government to be able to
control waters by virtue of the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution, 8 the water course must meet the narrow federal test.
'Such a strict test prohibits the federal government from asserting
authority over many state streams and lakes, thus giving the state
authorities a wide range of control. Even in regard to waterways
declared navigable under the federal test, a state may act in the
absence of conflicting federal legislation. 9 Since a state holds the
beds and overlying waters of navigable waterways in trust for the
public, it seems clear that the state can control these waters under
the power to control navigation in the absence of conflicting federal
rules. However, many water courses unable to meet the strict federal
test of navigability are suitable for public use. It had been the
practice to apply broader state tests of navigability in order to estab-
lish a waterway as navigable and thus susceptible to public control
by the states. For example, in Lamprey v. State, 20 the Minnesota
court went so far as to assert that the term "navigable" should be
discarded if it could not preserve and protect the rights of the public
to all beneficial uses of inland lakes. It was suggested that a clas-
sification system of public and private waters might be needed. A
recreational purpose in itself was sufficient to establish a waterway
as public, or navigable. Wisconsin also adopted a broad view allowing
the public to have rights in lakes navigable for any purpose, including
recreation.2' The state test was used in Minnesota until 1926 when
15. Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); United States v.
Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922). After the
Revolution, title to all navigable waters was held by the states in which they
were located, in trust for the people. Under the Constitution of the United States,
the states continued to hold title to the beds, but the states' control was subject to
the rights surrendered under the federal constitution. New states later admitted
to the Union have the same rights in regard to the beds of navigable waters
within their boundaries as do the thirteen original states.
17. Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
18. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
19. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
20. 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 ' =,).
21. Muench v. Public Serv. Commn, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952).
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the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the federal test
had to be used since a claim was being made under the federal con-
stitution. More recent Minnesota cases have affirmed the holding
that the federal test of navigability must be used in determining the
ownership of the beds.23 However, the Minnesota courts have refused
to completely reject the Lamprey24 test of public waters.25 It has
been said that the Lamprey test might still apply where Minnesota
conveyed land, bordering non-navigable waters as defined by the
federal test, to private riparians. For the state test to be applicable
the land had to be granted to the state by the United States after the
state's admission to the Union. In addition there has been a reasser-
tion of the old rule that the characterization of the waters of a lake
or a stream as public or private depends upon the ownership of the
beds, 2 6 but this was coupled with an indication that the court was
sympathetic toward greater public control.2 7 In State v. Adams, 8
the Minnesota court also hinted that the question of bed ownership
was an entirely different matter than the question of the right to
control the overlying waters. Although the federal test had to be
used in determining bed ownership, the issue of which test was to
govern when ascertaining the state's right to control the waters not
navigable under the federal test was left open.
So far as Minnesota is concerned the final separation of issues of
22. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). In dealing with
federal grants, which include waters, made to private individuals before the
territory became a state, it was earlier held that questions of the navigability
of such waters in order to ascertain bed ownership must be decided under federal
law, since the validity and effect of an act done by the United States is neces-
sarily a federal question. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S.
77, 87 (1922). In the Holt case, the actual holding would have been the same
even if the state test were applied. The decision pointed out that disposals by
the United States of lands under navigable waters, during the territorial period,
should not be regarded as intentional unless the intention was made very clear.
Due to the policy of the federal government of holding the beds of navigable
water courses for the ultimate benefit of future states, and by virtue of the con-
stitutional doctrine of equality with other states upon admission to the Union,
navigability was asserted to be a federal question. 270 U.S. at 55. Navigability
is a federal question in such instances even though the waters may not be capable
of use for navigation in interstate or foreign commerce. United States v. Oregon
295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
23. State v. Adams, 89 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 826
(1958); State v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 63 N.W.2d 278 (1954).
24. Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893).
25. State v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 118, 63 N.W.2d 278, 288 (1954).
26. Id. at 103, 63 N.W.2d at 278.
27. Id. at 123, 63 N.W.2d at 291.
28. 89 N.W.2d 661, 687 (Minn. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 826 (1958).
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bed ownership and control of overlying waters was made in Johnson
v. Seifert. 9 The court said:
The Federal test of navigability is designed for the narrow pur-
pose of determining the ownership of lakebeds, and for the
additional purpose of identifying waters over which the Federal
government is the paramount authority in the regulation of
navigation. Whether waters are navigable has no material bear-
ing on riparian rights since such rights do not arise from the
ownership of the lakebed but as an incident of the ownership of
the shore.3o
Cases in other jurisdictions have also held that the overlying waters
of lakes and streams are subject to various public rights even though
it is found that the beds are privately owned.31 However, merely
adopting a more liberal state test of navigability and applying it to
establish navigability and thereby public control on a lake-by-lake
or stream-by-stream basis would be too costly and uncertain. In some
states a determination of navigability would allow the public to use
a lake or stream not only for commercial transportation purposes,
but also for boating, fowling, skating, bathing, domestic and agri-
cultural uses, and cutting ice to be sold.32 However, since other
jurisdictions have held that the general right of navigation does not
necessarily include as incidents the rights of fishing, hunting and
trapping,33 a mere determination of navigability would not be a cer-
tain criterion for an assertion of governmental control for other
public uses. In addition, although Michigan, for example, has al-
lowed private ownership of the beds of inland navigable waters while
still enforcing an easement in favor of public navigation and fishing
rights,"' this view is in the minority.35 Michigan allows the public to
29. 100 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1960).
30. Id. at 694.
31. E.g., Swan Island Club v. Yarbrough, 209 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1954);
Ne-Bo-Shone Ass'n v. Hogarth, 81 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1936); Collins v. Gerhardt,
287 Mich. 38, 211 N.W. 115 (1926); Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d
1158 (1936).
32. Nelson v. De Long, 213 Minn. 425, 7 N.W.2d 342 (1942).
33. Sewers v. Hacklander, 219 Mich. 143, 188 N.W. 547 (1922) (trapping and
hunting declared not to be incident to the right of navigation). As a general rule,
rights of hunting and fishing are said to be based upon bed ownership and not
incident to navigation. 3 Tiffany, Real Property §§ 936, 937 (3d ed. 1939).
34. Collins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 211 N.W. 115 (1926).
35. Although such state courts as those in Michigan, Minnesota, and Wiscon-
sin, as well as the federal court in eastern North Carolina, have indicated their
preference for enforcing a public trust over navigable waters despite private
ownership of the beds, other jurisdictions have held to the older view of making
the incidents of water use follow the ownership of the soil. For the states follow-
ing the more modern view see, Swan Island Club v. Yarbrough, 209 F.2d 698 (4th
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fish in lakes and streams that are navigable even if the beds are
privately owned, 3 but excludes the public from fishing in all non-
navigable waters. Even in Michigan, however, hunting and trapping
are not incidents of the public easement of navigation.
7
In the final analysis, it is seen that bed ownership can be separ-
ated from the control of the overlying waters; that broad state tests
of navigability may serve as starting points in gaining more public
use and greater state control, but that more liberal tests of navigabil-
ity, without more, cannot provide an over-all solution to the wide
variety of water use problems.
B. PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
Legislation which predicates public control and use on public own-
ership could be held to constitute a taking of private property for
public use, thereby making it mandatory that the state compensate
a large class of people. But this is obviously not feasible and raises
many difficulties, especially from the viewpoint of expense. There is
the possibility of using eminent domain and then issuing licenses or
permits for water use conditioned on payment of a fee sufficient to
cover the costs of condemnation, but such a plan would involve many
administrative problems.
Under the common law, riparians owning part of the shore of a
nonnavigable lake were considered to own a pie-shaped slice out of
the bed of the lake itself.38 More recent decisions have declared that
all riparians on a nonnavigable lake have a common right to swim,
fish and boat on the entire expanse of the lake, regardless of the slice
of the bed that they may own. 39 It is not clear whether such a doctrine
would make it possible for the state to acquire a small area of the
lake site by condemnation and then allow the public to use the entire
expanse of the water. Obviously the public right would be held on
Cir. 1954) (dicta) ; Collins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 211 N.W. 115 (1926); John-
son v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 154, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960); Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo.
835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954); Muench v.'Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53
N.W.2d 514 (1952). For a statement of the older view and a list of cases that
have followed the older view see, 3 Tiffany, Real Property §§ 936, 937, (3d ed.
1939). There are also problems in this area as to whether a state has the power
to grant beds held in trust to private individuals and, if so, whether such grants
are still subject to some public rights. See Swan Island Club v. Yarbrough, supra.
36. Morgan v. Kloss, 244 Mich. 192, 221 N.W. 113 (1928) (Lake); Collins v.
Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 211 N.W. 115 (1926) (Stream).
37. Sewers v. Hacklander, 219 Mich. 143, 188 N.W. 547 (1922).
38. For a thorough discussion of the common law doctrine see Hardin v. Jor-
dan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
39. E.g., Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1959); Snively v. Jaber, 48
Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
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the basis of a riparian right and thus would be limited by the reason-
able use doctrine. ° Would it be reasonable to allow widespread
public use? There are indications that a private riparian owner of
part of a lake could invite the public, perhaps for a fee, to use the
entire lake. The Florida court in Duval v. Thomas" said:
We take judicial knowledge of the importance of "tourism" to
our state.... Fishing and swimming are prominent if not prin-
cipal items of the entertainment the stranger expects to find
here. If the enjoyment of non-navigable lakes were to be cur-
tailed or restricted by a holding that the owner of a portion of
one of them, and his guests, should enjoy the waters only within
the property lines the damage would be inmeasurable.4 2
It has also been held that a riparian is making an unreasonable use of
the water if he pumps water out of a nonnavigable lake, thereby inter-
fering with another riparian's business of renting equipment to the
public for fishing and boating.43 However, in general, the reasonable
use doctrine would probably tend to hinder the public use possibil-
ities to such an extent that the "paying guest" approach would not
be of major significance in solving problems of greater public use.4
Some states through their legislatures have established extensive
40. For example, in Meyers v. Lafayette Club, 197 Minn. 241, 248, 266 N.W.
861, 865 (1936), the court stated:
The right of a riparian owner to have the water retained in its original
state is qualified by the right of other riparian owners to make a reasonable
use of the water, even if such use results in some damage to the complainant.
The riparian owner has the right to make reasonable use of the water for
domestic, agricultural, and mechanical purposes, so far as it does not inter-
fere with the reasonable use of the water by other riparian owners.
41. Duval v. Thomas, 114 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1959).
42. Id. at 795. A starting point for allowing public access in the future to non-
navigable lakes as paying guests of private owners is established by the court's
inclusion of the rights of the guests of the riparian owner to the enjoyment of the
lake. See also, Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
43. Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
44. For a statement concerning the reasonable use limitations see supra note
40. It is questionable, for example, whether or not the courts would hold that
large numbers of the public could be invited to use a lake for recreational pur-
poses as paying guests of one riparian owner against the protests of other riparian
owners who claim their property values were being diminished, their privacy in-
vaded, their use of the waters unduly curtailed and restricted, etc. It would seem
that the courts would be more liberal in construing the reasonable use doctrine
if the public were actually the riparian owner as opposed to claiming rights to
use as guests of a private owner. See McCord v. Big Brothers Movement, 120
N.J.Eq. 446, 185 At. 480 (N.J. Chancery 1936) where it was held that it was
not a reasonable use to allow unlimited invitees to use water that was diverted
from the stream to a pond for swimming.
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systems of water regulation.45 Applicable to both navigable and
nonnavigable waters, most of these water programs set up permit
systems which are not based upon the public ownership principle
alone. Indiana has a particularly unique statute.46 It provides that:
The state of Indiana is hereby vested with full power and
control of all the public fresh water lakes.., in trust for the use
of all of its citizens for fishing, boating, swimming, the storage
of water to maintain water levels, and for any purposes for
which said lakes are ordinarily used and adapted, and no person
owning lands bordering any such lakes shall have the exclusive
right to the use of waters of any such lake or any part thereof.47
It appears as though the Indiana legislature desired to separate the
question of land ownership from water ownership. However, it is
strange that it should have asserted that "power and control" rather
'than "property" or "title" is held in trust for the citizens. Perhaps
the legislature was really thinking in terms of the police power
of the state. But on the other hand, contrary to the police power
approach, "power and control" of all fresh water lakes given in
trust to the state is based upon the acquiescence of bordering land-
owners. Public fresh water lakes are defined as "all lakes which
have been used by the public with the acquiescence of any riparian
owner. '48 Police power is not a function dependent upon acquiescence.
However, under the Indiana statute, once a lake is found to be public,
it may be used for any purpose for which it is ordinarily used and
adapted. Since there is no restriction as to initial use, it seems as
though a strict prescriptive property right is not being asserted.
What the Indiana legislature has actually done is to abandon the
concept of navigability in determining public rights. Acquiescence
in public use is made the test for ascertaining whether a lake is
public. After a lake is designated as public, the state asserts its
authority through the police power. An unanswered problem under
this statute is the amount or kind of use, with the acquiescence of an
owner, required before a lake becomes public. It seems that, al-
though contradictory language is used in the Indiana water statute,
an attempt is being made to control the waters by virtue of the police
power rather than through public ownership.
However, what would be the rights of the public under a statute
similar to that in Indiana if the basis were public ownership? Would
45. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 370.10(1) and §§ 373.071-373.251 (1960); Ind.
Ann. Stat. §§ 27-601-27-659 (Burns 1960); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 105.01-105.79
(West Supp. 1960); S.D. Code §§ 61.0101-61.1054 (Supp. 1960).
46. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 27-654 (Burns 1960).
47. Ibid.
48. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 27-656 (Burns 1960).
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acquiescence be dependent upon the running of the prescriptive
period? It has generally been held that the public cannot acquire
fishing rights by prescription. 49 Members of the public may acquire
such rights by prescription as individuals, but there is no extension
to the public at large. If the statute is interpreted as meaning that
the state gains control by prescription, it is contrary to the general
rule. Then, too, merely because the prescriptive period had run and
all the elements of adverse possession were applicable to some ripar-
ians, the public might nonetheless be allowed access even though they
unreasonably interfered with the rights of riparians against whom
the prescriptive period had not run.
Finally, it is possible that the legislature meant to presume dedica-
tionW by the acquiescence of the riparians; but, even here, there are
still many problems. Although there are contrary views on whether
the public can acquire fishing rights in a private lake by dedication,51
it appears safe to assume that the public can acquire some water
rights by dedication.5 2 Again, however, there is the possibility that
not all of the riparians on a given lake will make a dedication. Thus,
the issue of conflicts between the public and other riparians in regard
to reasonable use will be present. Allowing the public to use the
waters while recognizing the riparians' rights to damages if the
public use becomes unreasonable has been tried with poor results. 3
It would seem that an individual riparian would have difficulty in
proving damages, thereby allowing the public free rights. Such an
approach leads to many conflicts and cannot seriously be considered
as a legitimate solution to water use problems.
49. Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 595 (1958). See also, Baker v. Normanoch Ass'n, 25
N.J. 407, 136 A.2d 645 (1957).
50. For a general discussion of dedication see Tiffany, Real Property §§ 724-28
(abr. ed. 1940). Dedication is distinguished from prescription in that the former,
whether expressed or implied, is established by proof of an act of dedication,
consent of the owner and an intent to dedicate without reference to the period of
public use; whereas prescription is based on an adverse holding under color of
right for a specified period of time Davis v. Town of Bonaparte, 137 Iowa 196, 114
N.W. 896 (1908).
51. Compare Cobb v. Davenport, 33 N.J.L. (4 Vroom) 223 (1868) with Bass
Lake Co. v. Hollenbeck, 11 Ohio C.C.R. 508 (Cir. Ct. 1896).
52. Baker v. Normanoch Ass'n, 25 N.J. 407, 416, 136 A.2d 645, 650 (1957);
Village of Pewaukee v. Savory, 103 Wis. 271, 79 N.W. 436 (1899). The possibility
of use of the doctrine of dedication to the public is also suggested in State v.
Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 123, 63, N.W.2d 278, 291 (1954).
53. A statute allowing the public fishing rights in all state streams stocked at
public expense, subject to actions in trespass for any damage done to private prop-
erty along the banks was declared unconstitutional in Hartman v. Tresise, 36
Colo. 146, 84 Pac. 685 (1906). The court said that the statute violated private
property rights without just compensation in that it allowed the public use of
waters over private beds and access by trespass over the adjacent private soil.
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Indiana has also declared its natural resources and scenic beauty
to be a public right. 4 By statute the public has been given a vested
right in the preservation, protection and enjoyment of all public
fresh water lakes in their present state, and the use of such waters
for recreational purposes.5 Similarly, Florida has stated: "The
ownership, control of development and use of waters for all beneficial
purposes is within the jurisdiction of the state, which in the exercise
of its powers may establish measures to effectuate the proper and
comprehensive utilization and protection of the waters."" This stat-
ute was made applicable only to certain lakes for which it was ap-
propriate to extend a broader concept of public rights. Lakes, the
land around which was owned by only one person, were excluded from
the statute.5 7 To protect these water laws from attacks upon con-
stitutional grounds, it is provided that "the present property rights
of persons owning land and exercising existing water rights apper-
taining thereto shall be respected and such rights shall not be re-
stricted without due process of law nor divested without payment of
just compensation... ,,51 In North Dakota a constitutional provision
declares that all flowing streams and natural water courses should
forever remain the property of the state for mining, irrigating and
manufacturing purposes.5 9 It has been held that the constitutional
provision was not intended to divest riparians of any of their rights,°0
since such a provision would be void as a violaion of the fourteenth
amendment to the federal constitution.6 ' A South Dakota statute
establishing a water permit system and charging a state agency with
the administration of the act provides that all waters within the
state are the property of the people, subject to appropriation for
beneficial use.62 Again, however, vested rights are preserved.03 Al-
though some of these statutes remain as yet untested, it is safe to
assume that they will be upheld so long as prior vested rights are
protected. In Indiana, where the state's authority to control is based
upon the acquiescense of the private riparian,60 there is no taking
without the due process, for the real basis of control seems to be
54. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 27-620 (Burns 1960).
55. Ibid.
56. Fla. Laws 1955, c. 29748, § 1(b). See Maloney & Plager, Florida's Lakes:
Problems in a Water Pardise, 13 U. Fla. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1960).
57. Fla. Stat. § 373.081(3) (1960).
58. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 373.101 (1960).
59. N.D. Const. art. XVII, § 210 (1889).
60. State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330 (1949).
61. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. S.D. Code § 61.0101(2) (Supp. 1960).
63. S.D. Code § 61.0106 (Supp. 1960).
64. Ind. Ann. Stat. 4 27-656 (Burns 1960).
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police power rather than public ownership, and the courts are there-
fore less likely to find a taking of private property requiring compen-
sation. It remains to be seen how much control can be gained from
the statute since there is always the limitation of the protection pro-
vided to private rights which are being exercised.
Florida has also statutorily declared the state to be the owner for
the benefit of the people of all fish within the jurisdiction of the
state except those fish contained in privately owned ponds not ex-
ceeding 150 acres.6 5 However, assuming that a lake exceeding 150
acres is nonnavigable and has no outlet to navigable waters, it is
still not certain whether the state could regulate fishing by virtue of
the statute without violating constitutional guarantees. A claim of
right by a member of the public to fish in such a lake based solely on
a state license plus the statutory declaration of state ownership of
fish would probably be unsuccessful. 66
Analogous to the dedication theory of public ownership, it has been
suggested that some nonnavigable lakes might be made available to
the public through recognition of an easement.67 The water would
be made available to the public for hunting and fishing when, over
a period of years, a lake had been so used by the public or stocked
with fish at state expense. Thus, in Oregon a liberal test of navig-
ability has been coupled with a presumption of a public easement over
navigable waters, even though the beds remain in private hands. 8
The easement approach has received support in recent years, 9 be-
cause it allows public use for a variety of activities. Since the public
is not claiming under a riparian right, there are no strict limitations
of reasonable use, the public right being superior to that of the
riparians.7° In above mentioned situations it would seem that the
public could substantially impair, although not completely deprive,
a private riparian's rights without compensation. A suggested solution
for Florida's water problems provides for a differentiation between
lakes which meet the federal test of navigability and those that are
65. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 370.10(1) (1960).
66. See Hamilton v. Williams, 145 Fla. 697, 200 So. 80 (1941) (hunter with
license not allowed to trespass). See also, Winans v. Willetts, 197 Mich. 512, 163
N.W. 993 (1917) (No fishing allowed in private pond without permission from
owner even though fish were not private property and the state had the right to
control fishing therein).
67. Maloney & Plager, Florida's Lakes: Problems in a Water Paradise, 13 U.
Fla. L. Rev. 1, 14, 75 (1960).
68. Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936).
69. Maloney & Plager, op. cit. supra note 67, at 13; State v. Bollenbach, 241
Minn. 103, 123, 63 N.W.2d 278, 291 (1954) (dicta).
70. See Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 635, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (1936).
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navigable under a state definition.", The trust doctrine, allowing
state control, would be applied to lakes navigable under the federal
test, while the state test of navigability would be the basis for rec-
ognition of an easement for certain public uses (supposedly including
such incidents as boating, fishing and swimming) on lakes navig-
able under the state test. There would be no need to invalidate earlier
conveyances of beds to private individuals. Individual riparian rights
would still be protected but subordinated to the superior public
rights. Thus, the problem of violation of due process could be avoided.
Once the easement doctrine is established, the public can gain access
through riparian land by eminent domain procedure, if necessary.12
The easement approach would be of special value for states desiring
more public use for recreational aspects, although for an easement
determined by the state test of navigability to include recreational
uses it might, in many jurisdictions, be necessary for the legislature
to clearly list such uses. However, the state test of navigability
would not be helpful in gaining control of water for irrigation,
domestic purposes, industrial uses, or prevention of pollution since
such problems are not as closely related to navigation as are swim-
ming and fishing.
Some of the state statutes declaring what seemingly amounts to pub-
lic ownership in reality often do little more than assert the states'
rights to use the police power for the welfare of the citizens of the
state. If more than an assertion of police power is meant, this could
amount to a taking of property without due process of law if vested
rights were terminated. Thus, claims of state ownership of rights in
overlying waters can aid the states in gaining control of waters that
are not navigable by the federal test. State ownership can mean more
control by the state since there are no limitations similar to those im-
posed upon an assertion of the police power.73 Then, too, police power
results in regulation and control but cannot always gain more access
for the public in general. Public ownership theories combined with
the police power of the state can result in effective state regulation
and more public access.
C. MONETARY CONSIDERATIONS
Another possible way by which the public may be able to gain ac-
cess to "private" lakes is the granting of special tax benefits to
71. Maloney & Plager, op. cit. supra note 67, at 74.
72. As to the problem of getting the public to the lake without trespassing see,
Osceola County v. Triple E Dev. Co., 90 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. 1956) (concurring
opinion). See also, Flynn v. Beisel, 102 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 1960).
73. For a discussion of the limitations upon the police power see State ex. Tel.
Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923).
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encourage riparians to permit public entrance. Here again, however,
the public right would be substantially limited, since it would be
based upon a riparian right that was not superior to the rights of
other riparians who did not grant access to the public at large.
Special tax advantages have been offered to industries that use
equipment effective in preventing stream pollution.74 Minnesota has
by statute prohibited the stocking of fish at state expense in any lake
where the public is denied free access.7 5 Such monetary considerations
are helpful on a minor scale, but do not furnish an over-all solution
to the many water problems.
D. POLICE POWER
The police power of a state can be used to regulate a variety of
water uses.78 It is said that the police power can only be used for
the furtherance of the health, safety and welfare of the citizens, that
there must be a reasonable classification and that the assertion must
bear a real and substantial relation to a legitimate public end 77 The
limitations are not broad, especially when it is considered that the con-
cept of public welfare deals not only with physical and monetary mat-
ters but also with spiritual and aesthetic qualities.7 8 It has been recog-
nized that "the State as quasi-sovereign and representative of the
interests of the public has a standing in court to protect the atmos-
phere, the waters and the forests within its territory, irrespective of
the assent or dissent of the private owners of the land most immedi-
ately concerned."79 Generally, it has been asserted that every state is
free to change its law governing riparian ownership and to permit
appropriation of flowing waters for such purposes as it may deem
wise. 0 Statutory prohibition against wasting natural gas and oil by
proscribing flow for wells has been upheld against claims of depriva-
tion of property without due process of law. It was said that there
74. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-122(d) (1958).
75. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 97.485 (Supp. 1960).
76. State v. McCullagh, 96 Kan. 786, 153 Pac. 557 (1915) (hunting); Common-
wealth v. Hyde, 230 Mass. 6, 118 N.E. 643 (1918) (restrained fishing to prevent
pollution of drinking water); Gutierrez v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist.,
34 N.M. 346, 282 Pac. 1 (1929) (irrigation and flood control); Newton v. City of
Groesbeck, 299 S.W. 518 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) (restrained swimming to prevent
pollution of drinking water) ; State v. Quattropani, 99 Vt. 360, 133 Atl. 352 (1926)
(restrained boating to prevent pollution of drinking water).
77. See State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923).
78. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
79. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
80. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 702
(1899).
81. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
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was no infringement of vested property and that the state had a right
to exercise its police power. In an Arizona case82 the court stated that
where the public interest was significantly involved, the state had a
right to prohibit future drilling of wells for irrigation. It now seems
clearly settled that the police power can be used even if it means the
complete destruction of the property interest of the individual.8'
In most jurisdictions it would be essential to provide for a preser-
vation of vested rights in any proposed legislation granting sweeping
state control on the basis of the police power.
In Nelson v. Delong84 the state was recognized as having regulatory
powers, even to the point of hampering private rights. However,
that case involved a navigable lake the bed of which was held by the
state in trust for the people. The right to regulate was based not on
property rights, but upon governmental power to which all riparian
rights were subordinated. Nothing was intimated concerning what
powers the state might have over waters overlying privately owned
beds. In Wisconsin, on the other hand, it has been held that a munic-
ipality cannot, as an exercise of the police power, deprive a riparian
owner on a lake of using the water for swimming, bathing and boat-
ing without compensation. 85 Regulating and controlling waters over-
lying privately owned beds does not seem to be too much of a problem.
It is another matter, however, to assert that the police power alone
gives the public the right to use such waters. Dicta in the case of
State v. Adams8 poses the question, without giving an answer,
whether in Minnesota the police power extends to public recreational
uses of private beds. Similarly, a Wisconsin case87 implies that the
public could gain use of waters through the police power.
Where the public welfare of the state justifies greater public ac-
cess, the police power allows the public to utilize the waters for a
variety of recreational purposes. A legitimate public end is being
served. Nevertheless, if the waters actually were said to be owned by
the private individual, or the riparian rights were considered to be
vested, future deprivation of existing property rights might be con-
sidered a taking of property without due process of law. The Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Hudson Water Co. v. Mc-
82. Southwest Eng'r Co. v. Ernst, 79 Ariz. 403, 291 P.2d 764 (1955).
83. See, e.g., State ex rel. Green v. One 50 Inning Baseball Machine, 241 Ala.
455, 3 So. 2d 27 (1941) (destruction of gambling devices).
84. 213 Minn. 425, 7 N.W.2d 342 (1942). It seems as though the federal test of
navigability was used since it was admitted that if Congress had asserted its
jurisdiction the state's power to control would be subordinated thereto.
85. Bino v. City of Hurley, 273 Wis. 10, 76 N.W.2d 571 (1956).
86. 251 Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d 661, 687 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 826 (1958).
87. Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952).
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Carter,8 upheld a statute that impaired private property rights on
the ground that the statute was a proper exercise of the police power.
The Court indicated that the police power is all-encompassing. How-
ever, other jurisdictions have not regarded the police power so liber-
ally., As a general proposition, even though private property rights
are destroyed, there is not compensable taking of property if the exer-
cise of police power was valid. But in this context, generalizing about
the scope of the police power is not enough; instead, the crucial
problem is the relation of the public interest involved to the right
which is being limited or destroyed. The problem for the drafters of
water legislation is to find proper objectives for the application of
the power of the state to control waters. The problem is lessened
where the jurisdiction holds that the title to the beds of streams and
lakes can be separated from the ownership of the overlying waters.
Under these circumstances a legislative declaration of public owner-
ship of all waters can give the public a right of use of the waters
without destroying existing rights. Where no vested riparian rights
are involved, no substantial problems would develop. But in most
situations a state would have to include provisions protecting such
private rights unless it could be shown that continued exercise of the
private right threatened the achievement of the public goal. Control
and regulation of waters regardless of private bed ownership and
existing riparian rights can thus be asserted on the basis of the police
power.
CONCLUSION
There seems to be no doubt that greater public access and state
control is needed in many states. The guiding principle should be
to benefit the welfare of the state without unjustly hampering or
destroying private rights; and any water development program
probably should include the use of several theories in combination.
The easement approach protects private rights while allowing a
superior right of the public. Public ownership statutes can contain
provisions for the preservation of existing non-conflicting private
rights. More liberal state tests of navigability or an exercise of the
police power could regulate and control many water activities with-
out the necessity for any concept of public ownership. In combina-
tion these concepts of navigability, state ownership and the police
power provide an effective foundation for an adequate water pro-
gram. Establishing proper control now on a realistic theory may
prevent the necessity of drastic reform of water programs in the
future.
88. 209 U.S. 349, 355, 56 (1908).
89. For example, see Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 200
Cal. 81, 117-20, 252 Pac. 607, 622-23 (1926).
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